Risks and Benefits of Preexposure and Postexposure Smallpox Vaccination1 by Meltzer, Martin I.
This article presents a model and decision criteria for
evaluating a person’s risk of pre- or postexposure smallpox
vaccination in light of serious vaccine-related adverse
events (death, postvaccine encephalitis and progressive
vaccinia). Even at a 1-in-10 risk of 1,000 initial smallpox
cases, a person in a population of 280 million has a greater
risk for serious vaccine-related adverse events than a risk
for smallpox. For a healthcare worker to accept preexpo-
sure vaccination, the risk for contact with an infectious
smallpox case-patient must be >1 in 100, and the probabil-
ity of 1,000 initial cases must be >1 in 1,000. A member of
an investigation team would accept preexposure vaccina-
tion if his or her anticipated risk of contact is 1 in 2.5 and
the risk of attack is assumed to be >1 in 16,000. The only
circumstances in which postexposure vaccination would
not be accepted are the following: if vaccine efficacy were
<1%, the risk of transmission were <1%, and (simultane-
ously) the risk for serious vaccine-related adverse events
were >1 in 5,000.
S
mallpox has been identified as a weapon that may be
used by a bioterrorist (2,3). Terrorist groups and even
nations may have acquired stocks of smallpox produced in
the former Soviet Union (4). As a response to this threat,
the U.S. federal government has begun to produce and
stockpile approximately 300 million doses of smallpox
vaccine (2). Properly administered as a preexposure pro-
phylactic, the vaccine is approximately 95%-98% effec-
tive. However, smallpox vaccine contains a live virus (vac-
cinia), and a risk for serious, vaccine-related adverse
events exists (5,6). How the stockpile of smallpox vaccine
should be used is much debated. Some mathematical mod-
els have suggested that, in balancing the risks of a small-
pox attack against the risk for vaccine-related adverse
events, only healthcare workers need be vaccinated in a
preattack situation (7). This phase is essentially the first in
the current U.S. federal government’s smallpox response
plan (8,9).
Others have called for a large-scale, voluntary preexpo-
sure vaccination campaign open to the entire U.S. popula-
tion (10,11). Some concur with such a position in part
because they are skeptical that a postattack vaccination-
based response will be adequate (12). A telephone survey
of the U.S. population, conducted during October to
December 2002, found that 61% of the respondents would
accept smallpox vaccination if “. . . . offered as a precau-
tion against terrorist attacks” (13). However, despite this
trepidation about smallpox, the U.S. federal government‘s
program to vaccinate up to 500,000 healthcare workers
and first responders has found that concerns about vaccine-
associated risks has caused many to question the need for
preexposure vaccination (14–17). Part of this hesitancy
includes questions regarding compensation for vaccine-
related adverse events (17–19). 
This article presents a risk-benefit model of pre- and
postexposure smallpox vaccination, which will help public
health officials better understand the public’s risk-benefit
appraisal. Other papers have examined pre- and postsmall-
pox attack responses from a societal perspective (3,7). The
model presented quantifies the perspective of an individual
person. The model can be applied to other situations
involving pre- and postexposure prophylaxis for infectious
diseases (e.g., other vaccines).
Methods
I constructed a risk-benefit model (using a standard
computer-based spreadsheet; see online Appendix at URL:
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no11/03-0369_
spreadsht.xls), which balances the risks for smallpox dis-
ease against vaccine-related adverse events (vaccine-relat-
ed “disease”). The general model is formulated as follows:
Net risk of disease = (risk from smallpox without pre-
exposure vaccination) – (risk of smallpox due to vaccine
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Instute of Medicine, Washington, DC, 2002 (1).failure + risk for vaccine-related adverse events from pre-
exposure vaccination) and the precise formula is the fol-
lowing: 
Net risk for disease = 
(PR·PE·PT) – [(PR·PE·PT)(1–PVEpre) + PSideEffect·PValuation]
The symbols and the value for each variable are defined
in the Table. 
Definitions
The term “disease” refers to case-patients with clinical
symptoms caused by either smallpox or serious vaccine-
related adverse events. The phrase “serious vaccine-related
adverse events” includes death, postvaccinial encephalitis,
and progressive vaccinia. Each serious side-effect requires
medical care, such as vaccinia immunoglobulin, hospital-
ization, or a number of visits to a physician’s office. In
1968, the rate of postvaccinial encephalitis and progressive
vaccinia among first time vaccinees ranged from approxi-
mately 0.3 to 1.2 in 100,000 for those aged 1–19 years, 0.7
to 4 in 100,000 for those <1 year of age, and 0 to 1.4 in
100,000 for those >20 years of age (20,21). As most
preevent vaccinees are likely to adults, I used a rate of
1/100,000 vaccinees (PSideEffect, Table). Vaccine-related
adverse events such as eczema vaccinatum, soreness or red-
ness at site of vaccination, headache, and mild and tempo-
rary nausea are not considered to be serious vaccine-relat-
ed adverse events in the model. A risk for eczema vaccina-
tum occurs in about 1 in 100,000 primary vaccinations (20),
which can result in serious consequences requiring inten-
sive medical care, and even (rarely) death (6). I thus under-
estimate the risk for vaccine-related adverse events, biasing
the model toward acceptance of vaccination.
Decision Criteria
If net risk for disease is >0, then the risk for disease
from smallpox is greater than the risk for serious vaccine-
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Table. Model input variables and values used 
Values 
Variable  Symbol  Base cases  Sensitivity analyses 
Probability of attack  PR  1:10 –1:100,000   
No. of cases before detection of attack  XCASE  1,000  100,000 
General population “at risk”
a  XPOP  9 million or 280 million   
No. of susceptible HCW
b  XHCW  100,000 or 1,000,000   
Probability of exposure to smallpox, for an  PE     
Individual member of general populace
c    1:9,000 or 1:280,000  1:1
j 
Individual HCW contacting infectious person
d    1:100 or 1;100,000  1:1
j 
Individual member of investigation team
e    1:2.5 or 1:5  1:1
j 
Probability of transmission of smallpox, for an  PT     
Individual member of general populace
f    1.0  0.01–0.70
j 
Individual HCW contacting infectious person
g    0.70  0.01–0.70
j 
Individual member of investigation team
h    0.40  0.01–0.70
j 
Probability of vaccine effectiveness, preexposure  PVEpre  0.98
l   
Probability of serious vaccine-related adverse events
i  PSideEffect  1:100,000  1:500–1:1,000,000
j 
Probability of vaccine effectiveness, postexposure  PVEpost    0.01 - 0.60
j 
Relative individual valuation; case of smallpox  
Case(s) of serious vaccine related adverse  events
k 
PValuation  1:1  1:35 
aTwo populations “at risk” are modeled: a population of 9 million, representing a metropolitan area assumed to be the sole target of a smallpox attack and the entire 
U.S. population of approximately 280 million. Exactly how a given metropolitan area would be defined as the single target at risk is a matter of speculation. 
bHCW, healthcare worker. 
cRisk for exposure for member of the general populace is defined as the risk of contracting, and subsequently developing, a clinical case of smallpox before detection of 
the event (for individual person in general populace, PE = XCASE/XPOP). See text for further details. 
dRisk of a HCW’s becoming exposed is a function of the number of cases divided by number of susceptible HCWs (for HCW, PE = XCASE/XHCW). 
eProbability of a member of an investigation team being exposed to smallpox includes the probability of being sent to a site where smallpox may be present, such as in 
a container. There are no data that can be used to accurately define such a risk, and the data used here are assumed. 
fProbability of transmission of smallpox  = 1 indicates that the model only considers those members from the general populace in whom  a clinical case of smallpox 
develops. See text for further details. 
gProbability of transmission represents when HCWs are not using any effective barrier-type protection (e.g., gloves, gowns, masks). The rate of transmission used, 
0.70, is equivalent to the upper estimates of the rates of transmission to unvaccinated household members living with a smallpox patient (Appendix 1 in ref. 2). 
hProbability of transmission for investigation teams represents a risk after barrier-type protection is used. There are no data representing the actual reduction in risk, and 
the value of 0.40 is assumed. 
iSerious vaccine-related adverse events are defined as those adverse events which require “notable” amounts of medical care, such as vaccinia immunoglobulin, 
hospitalization, or a number of visits to a physician’s office. The rate of 1:100,000 is derived from the number of “serious” adverse events (e.g., death, postvaccine 
encephalitis, progressive vaccinia) measured in 1968 among first-time adult smallpox vaccinees (19,20) 
jThese values are used to examine the risk-benefit of an individual person’s accepting smallpox vaccination, including those being revaccinated, for preexposure and 
postexposure scenarios. See text for further details. 
kIn the base case, it was assumed that a person would value 1 case of smallpox equal to 1 case of serious vaccine-related adverse events. However, a person may be 
more worried about contracting a clinical case of smallpox than experiencing vaccine-related adverse events. Thus, in the sensitivity analyses, the valuation was altered 
to reflect a higher valuation of a case of smallpox relative to a case of serious vaccine-related adverse events (see text for further details). 
l Fenner et al. (22) reviewed five separate studies and reported vaccine efficacy to range from approximately 91% to 97%. related adverse events, and a person would chose preexpo-
sure vaccination. If the net risk for disease is <0, then the
risk for serious vaccine-related adverse events is greater
than the risk for smallpox, and an individual person would
chose no preexposure vaccination.
Scenarios
I use the model to evaluate the net risk for disease faced
by a person who is a member of one of the following three
groups: 1) The general population. The model compares
the risk of being a smallpox patient before an attack is
detected to the risk for serious vaccine-related adverse
events from preexposure vaccination. The risk of being an
actual smallpox patient is modeled by setting the risk for
transmission at 1 (Table). Two populations “at risk” are
modeled: a population of 9 million, representing a metro-
politan area assumed to be the sole target, and the entire
U.S. population of approximately 280 million. 2) The
healthcare community. For a healthcare worker (HCW)
who faces potential exposure to smallpox as a result of car-
ing for a person with smallpox, the risk of contracting
smallpox from the patient is compared with the risk for
serious vaccine-related adverse events attributable to pre-
exposure vaccination. 3) A smallpox investigation team.
For a person who is trained to be deployed to investigate
potential patients or attacks (i.e., deliberately seek out
potential smallpox patients and material that may be con-
taminated by smallpox), the risk for contracting smallpox
from the patient or other source of smallpox (e.g., aerosol,
container) is compared with the risk for serious vaccine-
related adverse events from preexposure vaccination.
Investigation team members will take precautions to
reduce risk for transmission (e.g., wear gloves, face masks,
and gowns), reducing risk for transmission to an assumed
0.4 (no data exist regarding the actual reduction in risk
attributable to using such barrier precautions).
For all scenarios, after an attack is detected, I assume
that appropriate responses will be taken, including effec-
tive isolation of patients (2) and vaccination of susceptible
contacts. Thus, the results only apply up to the point of dis-
covery of the bioterrorist event.
Sensitivity Analyses
In the model, I assume that persons considering preex-
posure vaccination value equally the risk for disease from
either smallpox or from serious vaccine-related adverse
events. In reality, a person may be more worried about
contacting a clinical case of smallpox than of experiencing
serious vaccine-related adverse events. The risk of dying
from smallpox vaccine is approximately 1:1,000,000 vac-
cinees (20,21), while the death rate due to smallpox may
be as high as 30% of all unvaccinated clinical cases
(23,24). Using the relative risk of death, I set a compara-
tive value of 1 case of smallpox = 35 cases of serious vac-
cine-related adverse events (PValuation = 1/35 = 0.02857).
2
Other sensitivity analyses include increasing the number
of cases of smallpox before detection of the attack from
1,000 to 100,000 (Table), and setting the risk for serious
vaccine-related adverse events to either 1 in 10,000 or 1 in
1,000,000. The former represents the risk of experiencing
probable vaccine-related myocarditis or pericarditis, as
measured during the current smallpox vaccination pro-
gram among civilians (25). The latter is the risk, measured
in the 1960s, of serious vaccine-related adverse events
(e.g., postvaccinial encephalitis and progressive vaccinia)
among revaccinees (20,21).
Risk-Benefit Analysis of Postexposure Vaccination
The model can used to evaluate a person’s perspective
of the risks and benefits of receiving a smallpox postexpo-
sure vaccination. I considered a person who has been
exposed to somebody who may or may not have smallpox.
To model such uncertainty, I set PR = 1, and let PE range
from 1 in 10 to 1 in 100,000. I then assumed either a pos-
texposure vaccine efficacy of 10% (PVEpost, Sensitivity
analyses, Table) and a risk for transmission of 70% (PT,
Sensitivity analyses, Table), or a postexposure vaccine
efficacy of 60% and a risk for transmission of 35%.
Additional sensitivity analyses can further vary the values
for transmission and efficacy of postexposure vaccination.
I also considered the case in which a person has been
exposed to a definite smallpox case (i.e., PR = 1, PE = 1). I
examined the risk-benefit of postexposure vaccination
using a range of risks for vaccine-related adverse events,
from 1 in 500 vaccinees to 1 in 100,000 vaccinees. This
range encompasses the risks for serious vaccine-related
adverse events faced by those without any contraindica-
tions for receiving the vaccine, as well as those who would
have contraindications for receiving preexposure vaccina-
tion (e.g., pregnant women, those with auto-immune dis-
eases, HIV-positive persons). I modeled a “worst case”
approach and assumed that postexposure vaccine efficacy
would only be 1% (representing, for example, a delay of
several days between exposure and being offered the vac-
cine). The risk for transmission was set at either 1% or
30%, representing possible scenarios, for example, the per-
son considering postexposure vaccination was appropri-
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2Assume that only a single metropolitan population of 9 million is
at risk from an initial attack, and the initial attack results in 1,000
cases before discovery. For a person in that population, the risk for
death from smallpox is approximately 33 times greater than the
risk for death from the smallpox vaccine [smallpox risk for
death/vaccine-related risk for death = (1,000 cases/ 9 million x
0.3)/0.000001]. For a person in a population of 280 million, the risk
of dying from smallpox in the initial 1,000 cases is approximately
equal to the risk for death from the vaccine.ately wearing gloves, gown, and mask in the presence of
the infected person or only had a very brief contact.
Time and the Need for Revaccinations 
No data exist that record the percentage of persons in a
cohort who remain free from smallpox over time (in years)
after immunization against smallpox.
3 Data from relative-
ly small studies describe levels (titers) of vaccine-induced
neutralizing antibodies for up to 50 years after vaccination
or revaccination (28,29). No data correlate antibody titers
to immunity from disease. Without data describing the
duration of protection afforded by a single vaccination, the
current model does not consider the need for additional
revaccinations over time. Thus, the results for this model
only apply to the primary vaccinations. The model does
not discount risk over-time, although some evidence exists
that persons have a high discount rate for personal health
issues (30).
Results
When these decision criteria are used for a person in a
general population of 280 million, the risk for serious vac-
cine-related adverse events is greater than the risk for
smallpox (Figure 1a). This is true even if the risk for a
smallpox attack is 1 in 10. An individual person would
therefore decline preexposure vaccination. Only when the
population at risk is limited to 9 million and the risk for
attack approaches 1 in 10, does the risk for smallpox out-
weigh the risk for serious vaccine-related adverse events,
indicating that the person would accept vaccination
(Figure 1a). For a HCWto accept preexposure vaccination,
the risk for contact with an infectious case of smallpox
must be >1 in 100 and the probability of an attack causing
1,000 cases must be >1 in 1,000 (Figure 1b). If the risk for
contact drops to 1 in 1,000, then the risk for attack must be
>1 in 100 to accept vaccination (Figure 1b). For a member
of an investigation team, if the anticipated risk for contact
is 1 in 2.5 and the risk for attack is >1 in 16,000, then a
team member would accept preexposure vaccination
(Figure 1c). If the risk for contact drops to 1 in 5, then the
risk for attack must increase to >1 in 8,000 for the person
to accept preexposure vaccination (Figure 1c).
Sensitivity Analyses
If a member of the general population of 280 million
were to equate 1 case of smallpox to 35 cases of serious
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Figure 1. Risk-benefit analyses for individual persons evaluating
the risk for smallpox versus the risk for serious smallpox vaccine-
related adverse events: three scenarios. If the net risk is >0 (above
neutral), then a person will accept preexposure vaccination. If the
net risk is <0 (below neutral), then the person would not accept
preexposure vaccination. Part a considers a person who is either
a member of a population of 9 million, representing a metropolitan
area assumed to be the sole target of a smallpox attack and the
entire U.S. population of approximately 280 million. In part b, the
risk for contact by an individual healthcare worker is a function of
probability of contact x probability of transmission (PE x PT, see
Table and text for further details). In part c, investigation team
members are assumed to take precautions against transmission
(e.g., wear gloves, face masks, and gowns) to reduce risk to 0.4
(no data of the actual reduction in risk due to using such barrier
precautions). Threshold values of risk for smallpox attack, when
net risk = 0 (neutral), are rounded to the nearest 1,000. All three
parts  present data calculated on the basis of an attack that initial-
ly causes 1,000 cases before detection of the attack. See Table
and text for other assumptions.
3In data reported by Rao from Madras, India (Figures 17/1 and
17/3 [23]), among the unvaccinated, approximately 80% of all
cases of smallpox occurred in children <10 years of age.  Adistinct
shift in age of the case-patients occurred among the vaccinated,
with <10% of cases occurring in children <10 years of age, 19% of
cases occurring in children 10-19 years, and 46% of cases occur-
ring in persons 20-30 years of age. Rao did not report at what age
most of those vaccinated received vaccine (a likely hypothesis
would be before 2 years of age). Further complicating the analysis
of such data is the fact that many persons in Madras received
more than one smallpox vaccination (Figure 17/5, [23]). A similar
age-shift in occurrence of cases among the vaccinated can be dis-
cerned from the data reported by Hanna (24) from Liverpool,
England, in 1902-03. The data from both Rao (23) and Hanna (26)
further indicate that even a 20-year-old vaccination may reduce
the severity of disease. The risk for death is markedly reduced 20-
30 years postvaccination (23,26,27).vaccine-related adverse events, they would accept preex-
posure vaccination only if the risk for a smallpox attack
approached 1 in 10 (Figure 2a). However, if the risk for
attack is assumed to be 1 in 100, then the person would
have to equate 1 case of smallpox to 290 cases of serious
vaccine-related adverse events to accept preexposure vac-
cination (data not shown). If a person assumes both that
the initial attack would cause 100,000 cases before detec-
tion and that 1 case of smallpox is equivalent to 35 cases
of serious vaccine–related adverse events, then the risk for
attack would have to be >1 in 1,000 to accept preexposure
vaccination (Figure 2b).
Assuming a risk for serious vaccine-related adverse
events of 1 in 10,000 (25) and the same values used to pro-
duce Figure 1a, a person in a population of 9 million would
not accept vaccination even if the risk for attack were 1 in
2. When the same risk for adverse events is used in consid-
ering the scenarios evaluated in Figure 2b (100,000 cases
before detection, valuation of 1 case smallpox = 35 cases
of vaccine-related adverse events), the risk for attack
would have to be >8 in 1,000 before accepting vaccination
(results not shown).
Revaccination
For a person in a population of 280 million who is con-
sidering preexposure revaccination with a risk for serious
vaccine-related adverse events of 1 in 1,000,000, even at a
1 in 10 risk for smallpox attack, the net risk is <0, and the
decision criteria would indicate not accepting revaccina-
tion (scenario assumed 1,000 smallpox cases before dis-
covery of the attack, and setting PValuation = 1:1). In the same
scenario, if PValuation = 1:35, then the risk for a smallpox
attack would have to be >1 in 125 for a person to accept
revaccination. For a HCW to accept preexpsoure vaccina-
tion, the risk for attack would have to be >1 in 700 (risk for
contact = 1-in-1,000; PValuation = 1:1; revaccination PSideEffect
= 1-in-1,000,000). If the HCW assumed that the risk for
contact increased to 1 in 100, then the risk for attack would
have to be >1 in 7,000 in order to accept revaccination.
Postexposure Vaccination
After uncertain exposure to smallpox (e.g., contact with
a person who may or may not be infectious with small-
pox), the decision criteria would indicate acceptance of
postexposure vaccination if the risk for exposure is thought
to be >1 in 21,000; the risk for transmission is assumed to
be 35%, and efficacy of postexposure vaccine is 60%
(Figure 3a). If the risk for transmission is assumed to be
70%, but postexposure vaccine efficacy only 10% (e.g.,
postexposure vaccination offered several days after poten-
tial exposure), vaccination would be accepted only if the
risk for exposure is assumed to be >1 in 8,000 (Figure 3a).
If postexposure vaccine efficacy were set at 98%, and risk
for transmission at 70%, then risk for actual exposure to
smallpox would have to be >1 in 69,000 in order to accept
postexposure (data not shown).
For persons who have had a definite exposure to small-
pox, the only time that postexposure vaccination would not
be accepted is if vaccine efficacy was <1%, risk of trans-
mission was <1%, and the risk for serious vaccine-related
adverse events were >1 in 5,000 (Figure 3b). In the same
scenario, if the risk for transmission were 30%, postexpo-
sure vaccination would accepted even if risk for serious
vaccine-related adverse events were 1 in 500 (Figure 3b).
Figures 1 and 2 show that the single most influential
variable impacting the net risk for disease, and therefore
the decision to accept preexposure vaccination, was the
probability of attack of smallpox. For persons in the gen-
eral population, the second most important variable is the
valuation of one case of smallpox relative to cases of seri-
ous vaccine-related adverse events (PValuation). For a HCW
or a member of an investigation team, the second most
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Figure 2. Sensitivity analyses: impact of altering a person’s value
of a case of smallpox relative to a case of serious smallpox vac-
cine-related adverse events. If the net risk is >0 (above neutral),
then a person will accept preexposure vaccination. If the net risk
is <0 (below neutral), then the person would not accept preexpo-
sure vaccination. Both parts show the impact of altering a person’s
valuation of a case of smallpox relative to a case of serious vac-
cine-related adverse events. Part a shows the net risks for an indi-
vidual person’s considering preexposure smallpox vaccination
with an attack causing clinical cases of smallpox to develop in
1,000 persons. Part b shows the net risks for a person when an
attack causes clinical cases of smallpox to develop in 100,000 per-
sons (see text for further details).important variable was the risk for contact with a smallpox
patient or infectious material.
Conclusions
The model suggests that most persons in the general
population would not accept preexposure smallpox vacci-
nation. Increasing the risk for vaccine-related adverse
events (e.g., including the risk for eczema vaccinatum and
vaccine-related myocarditis orpericarditis) moves all the
graph lines in Figures 1 and 2 downward. This supposition
increases the likelihood of not accepting preexposure vac-
cination. These results and conclusions are not unique. In
1971, some argued that the risks for routine childhood
smallpox vaccination in the United States outweighed the
risks of contracting a case of smallpox (4,31,32). These
arguments influenced the 1971 recommendation to stop
routine childhood immunization against smallpox in the
United States (33). The studies and arguments influencing
the decision took an implicit societal perspective, while this
study considers the perspective of the individual person.
For an individual healthcare worker, the decision to
accept preexposure vaccination hinges almost as much on
the assessment of risk for contact (before discovery of
attack) as on the assessment of risk of attack. In the mid-
Atlantic states of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
(New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania), approximate-
ly 440 general hospitals exist; 83% operate an emergency
room (34). These hospitals are staffed by approximately
18,000 full-time equivalents (FTEs) physicians and den-
tists, 160,000 nurse FTEs (in NY 1 nurse FTE = 1.13 per-
sons), 24,144 trainees and approximately 430,000 “other
salaried” staff, for a total staff of approximately 650,000
(34,35). If one assumes that 10% work in the emergency
rooms, 65,000 hospital staff in New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania are vulnerable to infection before a smallpox
attack is detected. Further assume that an attack causes
1,000 smallpox cases confined to the New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania area. By days 7–8 postinfection, <20%
of those will proceed to the prodrome and rash stages (1,2),
perhaps causing medical care to be sought. Blendon et al.
(13) reported that 52% of survey respondents stated that
they would go to their own family doctor if they thought
they had smallpox, with 42% stating that they would go to
a hospital emergency room. Thus, approximately 100
patients (1,000 x 20% early cases x 50% to hospital) might
seek medical care at a hospital in the first 7–9 days after
infection.
The healthcare workers in emergency rooms therefore
face a risk for exposure to an infectious smallpox patient
of change to <1 in 600 (65,000/100). If one assumes a risk
for transmission of 70%, the risk of contracting smallpox
is almost 1 in 1,000. The many part-time and temporary
workers in a hospital further reduces this risk ratio. Even if
one patient can potentially infect up to 10 healthcare work-
ers in a hospital setting (36), the risk is still 1 in 65. Note
that the risk for exposure is not confined to medical doc-
tors or nurses. Many members of a hospital staff, such as
those working in housekeeping and maintenance, are at
risk of coming into contact with an infectious patient.
Figure 3a may suggest to some that almost any expo-
sure to a possible case of smallpox, such as coming into
contact with a person with an unexplained rash, would
warrant immediate postexposure vaccination (e.g., before
laboratory confirmation that patient with unknown rash
actually had smallpox). However, postexposure vaccina-
tion given within 7 days after exposure reduces the risk of
a clinical case of smallpox developing to approximately
2% compared with 79% among those never vaccinated
(37). If vaccination is delayed up to 10 days postexposure,
then the risk for smallpox may be reduced just 22% (from
96% among those never vaccinated to 75% among those
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Figure 3. Risk-benefit analyses for persons considering postexpo-
sure smallpox vaccination: two scenarios. If the net risk is >0
(above neutral), then the person will accept postexposure vaccina-
tion. In the net risk is <0 (below neutral), then the person would not
accept postexposure vaccination. Part a shows the net risk for
postexposure smallpox vaccination for a person who has been
exposed to somebody who may or may not have smallpox (i.e.,
the exposure is uncertain). Threshold values of risk for exposure
to smallpox, when net risk = 0 (neutral), are rounded to the near-
est 1,000. Part b shows the net risk for an individual person who
has been exposed to a definite smallpox case (see text for further
details).vaccinated within 10 days postexposure) (38).
4 A more
compelling conclusion from Figure 3a is that if, by day 6
postexposure, the type of exposure cannot be accurately
determined and a person could have been exposed to
smallpox (i.e., risk for exposure is >1 in 21,000), then the
person would use the decision criteria to accept postexpo-
sure vaccination.
The biggest problem in interpreting the results from the
model is understanding how a person will actually value
risks and events. Valuing risks depends on understanding
probabilities, which are often difficult to explain (41).
Even the type of visual aid used to explain risk can make a
difference in valuation (42). Merely stating a number (e.g.,
1 in 10,000) is often not sufficient. A person’s valuation of
the risks and benefits of vaccination may include factors
not explicitly defined in the model. A person may accept
preexposure vaccination, for example, as an attempt to
reduce potential risk for smallpox to family and friends
and even out of a sense of duty to society in general. The
valuation of a case of smallpox relative to a case of serious
vaccine-related adverse events is a proxy for valuing a per-
son’s contribution to family, friends, and society.
Public health planners and medical care providers
should appreciate the extent that an individual acceptance
or rejection of smallpox vaccination depends on valua-
tion of risk and benefits. A person’s risk aversion is not
completely explained by numerical analyses (43,44). A
person’s valuation of risk depends on a variety of factors,
including a sense of control, degree of trust of the source
providing the data, the newness of the risk, and even the
passage of time (41,45). Note that time and information
may not alter the actual risk faced, but a factor such as
new information (e.g., reported cases of vaccine-related
adverse events) could alter the perception and valuation
of risk. Accurately predicting the direction and extent of
a change in valuation attributable to, for example, new
information may not be possible. Public health officials,
however, must always be prepared to explain how the
new information alters the risks involved. Explaining a
given risk, and how a new development may impact that
risk, will likely require more than just a single numerical
statement.
Dr. Meltzer is senior health economist in the Office of
Surveillance, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. His research interests include
studying the economics of interventions to control and prevent
infectious diseases and providing economic data to aid the plan-
ning for catastrophic infectious disease events.
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